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Appellate Practice and Procedure
by William M. Droze*
I.

INTRODUCTION

An appellate court is often characterized by the opinions that it writes.
Though an appellate opinion represents a written expression and
extension of the judicial personality, it is necessarily dictated in part by
the facts of the case. As a result, a court's application of appellate
procedure may serve as a better crucible for assembling a judicial
portrait and undertaking to study trends and direction.
This Article examines recent appellate cases with a view towards
understanding appellate direction as well as assisting the practitioner
with an overview of appellate procedure in action. The Eleventh
Circuit's emphasis on professionalism and on active management of its
docket during 1997 is beneficial to both practitioners and parties. Taken
in totality, the cases that follow plot a course towards increased
accountability that translates into efficient and effective appellate
decisionmaking. The phrase "sound judicial administration" appears
frequently in 1997 cases, reflecting the court's insistence that litigants
and lower courts ease the burden on appellate dockets.
II.

TRENDS TOWARDS PROFESSIONALISM AND ACTIVE DOCKET
MANAGEMENT

The court of appeals used Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp.' to
deliver a reminder to the district courts that they must take an active
role in managing cases on their dockets.2 Chudasama related to a
discovery dispute when the district court entered a default judgment

* Senior Associate with the law firm of Troutman Sanders L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia.
University of North Carolina (A.B., 1984); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1987).
1. 123 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1997).
2. Id. at 1366 (citing William W. Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial
Judge's Role, 61 JUDICATURE 400, 402, 404 (1978)).
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against a defendant-manufacturer for failing to comply with a discovery
order.3 In reversing the district court, the court was openly critical of
the failure of the district court to supervise discovery as well as its
apparent abdication to plaintiff's counsel of the responsibility of
preparing sensitive, dispositive orders. 4 Further, according to the
opinion, a district court's failure to consider and rule on significant
pretrial motions prior to issuing dispositive orders can constitute an
abuse of discretion.5 While empathizing with the plight of the district
courts following the imposition of strict case management deadlines,'
the court of appeals nonetheless expressed the view that critical pretrial
motions cannot be deferred until a final pretrial conference unless
absolutely necessary.' Though framed as a direction to the district
courts, the decision in Chudasama stands testament to the manner in
which like cases will be treated in future appeals should a docket be
ineffectively or improperly managed below.
Punctuating its commitment to aggressive docket management, the
court of appeals in Fabric v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co.'
exercised its power to order summary judgment on appeal even though
the beneficiary of that judgment did not assert a motion in the district
court.9 Characterizing the insurance contract dispute case as a "slam
dunk," the court noted that the power of an appellate court to award
summary judgment even when not sought below has been widely
recognized.'0 For relief to be granted, all facts bearing on the issue
decided must be before the court and must demonstrate that the
nonmovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Given the
court's express recognition that awarding summary judgment to a
nonmovant is an accepted method of expediting litigation, 2 practitio-

3. Id. at 1362.
4. Id. at 1366-68. The court of appeals even took the extraordinary step of reassigning
the case to another district judge upon its return to the district court. Id. at 1373.

5. Id. at 1367.
6. Id. at 1368 n.38 (citing Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1994)).
7. Id.
8. 115 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 1997).
9. Id. at 914-15.

10. Id.
11. Id. at 915. The court distinguished Latecoere International,Inc. v. United States
Departmentof Navy, 19 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1994), on the ground that its refusal to award
summary judgment on appeal in that case was factually related to the fear that appellant
would be deprived of an opportunity to present its side of the dispute.
12. 115 F.3d at 915. Compare Massey v. Congress Life Insurance Co., 116 F.3d 1414
(11th Cir. 1997), in which the court of appeals reversed the district court's sua sponte
award of summary judgment for failure to give the nonmovant the required ten-day
mandatory advance notice prior to entry of summary judgment. Id. at 1418.
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ners may wish to consider seeking that relief to avoid further proceedings in the district court after remand.
The court of appeals did not limit its guidance to the district courts in
the past year. In Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale," the court
emphasized attorneys' obligations under the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure 4 in the context of a qualified immunity appeal." Counsel
for both parties were taken to task for failing to submit an adequate
statement of relevant facts with corresponding record cites. 6 The court
further noted a violation of Eleventh Circuit Rule 28-2(I)(ii), 7 which
contemplates that a proper statement of facts reflects a high standard
of professionalism, lists both favorable and unfavorable facts, and
identifies all inferences drawn from the facts. 8 The court cautioned
that these requirements are not to be taken lightly, especially because
the court of appeals is not required to cull an appellate record in search
of facts not included in the statement of facts. 9 That the court
prominently placed this discussion at the forefront of the opinion and
devoted time to its discussion should serve as a reminder to future
practitioners before the court that the high standard set in the court
rules is not merely directory.
An example of the consequences of failing to abide by the federal rules
is found in Adler v. Duval County School Board," a case relating to a
challenge to a school district's policy of allowing prayer at a graduation
ceremony.2 ' After finding that appellants' injunctive relief claims were
moot given their graduation from high school, the court of appeals held
that their damages claim had been waived due to their failure to
appropriately address that claim by appellate brief.22 The court found
appellants had failed to include the damages claim within their
statement of issues presented for review and had omitted a demand that
the court of appeals instruct the district court on remand to award
monetary relief or hold proceedings thereon. 3 Construing this inattentiveness to the rules as a "glaring omission,"24 the court plainly intends

13. 126 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir. 1997).
14. FzD. R. APP. P. 28.

15. 126 F.3d at 1373.
16. Id,
17. 11TH CR. R. 28-2(I)(ii).
18. 126 F.3d at 1373 n.1.
19. Id. at 1373.
20. 112 F.3d 1475 (11th Cir. 1997).

21. Id. at 1476.
22. Id. at 1478, 1480-81.
23. Id, at 1480-81.
24. Id, at 1481 n.12.
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to hold litigants to the requirements of the rules when necessary to
assure a fully developed record and a complete and concise argument of
the issues to be decided upon appeal.
In Schlumberger Technologies, Inc. v. Wiley,25 the court of appeals
examined circuit law relative to the decision of a district court not to
permit an attorney to practice in a pro hac vice capacity. 6 Noting some
confusion regarding the relevant standard of review, the court indicated
that it would review factual findings for clear error and the district
court's application of the rules of professional conduct de novo" The
court of appeals vacated the lower court order and held that binding
circuit precedent requires a showing of unethical conduct sufficient to
justify disbarment of a lawyer in order to justify denial of admission pro
hac vice.' In furtherance of its accountability posture through 1997,
the court of appeals insisted that the district courts rest disqualification
decisions on the violation of specific rules of professional conduct, not
upon a subjective opinion that may vary from court to court.'
III. APPELLATE TREATMENT OF INTERLOCUTORY MATTERS
During 1997 the court of appeals had numerous opportunities to
consider interlocutory matters. Appellate practice and procedure is
implicit in interlocutory matters, perhaps more than in final matters,
given that litigants bear the additional burden of assuring that a case
is subject to immediate appeal. Often, failure to meet appropriate time
deadlines or to demonstrate a case appropriate for interlocutory
treatment will prove as fatal to the appeal as would untimely filing of
a notice of appeal.3 0
Section 1292(a)(1) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code confers upon courts of
appeals jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeals from decisions of
the district courts granting, refusing, or dissolving injunctions. 1 In
undertaking review of such appeals, this circuit has adopted the view
that the reviewing court delve no further into the merits than necessary
to resolve the appeal. 2 Courts have elected this approach not due to

25. 113 F.3d 1553 (11th Cir. 1997).
26. Id. at 1558.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1561-62.
29. Id. at 1561.
30. See generally Pinion v. Dow Chem., U.S.A., 928 F.2d 1522, 1525 (11th Cir. 1991).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1994).
32. Massey, 116 F.3d at 1416. The court applied this principle in American Express
FinancialAdvisors, Inc. v. Makarewicz, 122 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1997), in which the
court considered a denial of injunctive relief in an arbitration case but declined to review
the district court order granting a stay because it had not been certified under 28 U.S.C.
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jurisdictional strictures but rather as an accommodation to sound
judicial administration. 3 That approach did not change during 1997.
The court of appeals addressed the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) in the bankruptcy context in In re Culton." In Culton the
district court ordered the bankruptcy court to undertake a further
proceeding rendering the order appealed from interlocutory" Alternatively, the parties argued that the appeal should be treated as one under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because the district court order had the effect of
nullifying a discharge of the debtor that could be considered to have
37
injunctive effect. 36 Under Carson v. American Brands, Inc., an
interlocutory order with injunctive effect that causes serious or
irreparable consequences and can only be effectively challenged by
3
immediate appeal may be appealed under section 1292(a)(1). 8 The
court found that Culton did not meet the Carson test because all that
occurred was the institution or reinstatement of a proceeding to revoke
a discharge, and the court dismissed the appeal.3 9
Certification of an order as final under rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure ("Rule 54(b)")4" is another method by which an
interlocutory decision may reach an appellate court. Evaluating this
4
process in Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Board of Education, ' the
court of appeals reiterated that a district court's Rule 54(b) certification
is not conclusive on the appellate court.42 The court also noted that it
will evaluate the certification in the interest of sound judicial administration but will not overturn the certification unless it was clearly
unreasonable.43 The court found the certification unreasonable in
Ebrahimiand found no deference due the district court when it failed to
clearly and cogently articulate the factual and legal reasons warranting

§ 1292(b) (1994).
33. 116 F.3d at 1416.
34. 111 F.3d 92 (11th Cir. 1997).
35. Id. at 93. Compare In re HillsboroughHoldings Corp., 116 F.3d 1391 (11th Cir.
1997). In HillsboroughHoldings the court of appeals noted that to be final an order need
not be the last order that concludes a bankruptcy case given that bankruptcy proceedings
are an aggregation of controversies and may require final treatment, especially as to key
assets of the debtor's estate. Id. at 1393-94. Thus, any order that concludes a particular
adversary proceeding may be deemed final and reviewable. Id. at 1393.
36. 111 F.3d at 93-94 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(aX2) (1994)).
37. 450 U.S. 79 (1981).
38. Id. at 79.
39. 111 F.3d at 94.

40. FED. R. Cw. P. 54(b).
41. 114 F.3d 162 (l1th Cir. 1997).
42. Id. at 166.

43. Id.
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certification." The court of appeals criticized the district court for not
undertaking to narrow and define the issues prior to certification and
emphasized that sound judicial administration is not furthered when a
three-judge panel must familiarize itself with a record that could have
been evaluated by a single judge intimately familiar with the whole
case." The better practice, according to the per curiam opinion, was
to certify questions warranting appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),"
furnishing the appellate court with the opportunity to protect its docket
and choose whether an appeal is taken. 7
When an order is not final (permitting review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291), 4 does not fall within that class of order authorizing interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), and has not been certified for
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), it may nonetheless be subject to
appeal under the collateral order doctrine announced by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Life Industrial Loan Corp.49 In
fact, this circuit recognizes three exceptions to the finality requirement
for purposes of appeal. Interlocutory orders may be directly appealed
under the collateral order doctrine, the doctrine of practical finality (the
Forgay-Conrad rule), or the exception for intermediate resolution of
issues fundamental to the merits of the case.5" The doctrine of practical finality applies in cases relating to property contests, 1 and the
intermediate resolution exception has received a very narrow construction.52 Thus, the Cohen, or collateral order doctrine, is most widely
applied.
One familiar application of the Cohen doctrine is an appeal of a denial
of qualified immunity to a public official in an action brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 53 Class action defendants in Jordan v. AVCO
Financial Services, Inc.5 attempted to exploit the accepted nature of

44. Id. at 167.
45. Id.
46. Addressing this procedure in Kemp v. IBM Corp., 109 F.3d 708, 711 (11th Cir.
1997), the court also observed that jurisdiction of an appeal on a certified question to a
district court is not limited to the precise question certified because it is the district court
order and not the certified question that is brought before the appellate court.
47. 114 F.3d at 168 n.1.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
49. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). To be reviewable under Cohen, an order must conclusively
determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the
merits, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Id. at 546.
50. Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 579 n.8 (11th Cir. 1997).
51. Id.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). See Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir. 1997).
117 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1997).
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those types of appeals by arguing an analogy existed to their defense
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.5" They argued that the proscription
on interference in insurance rose to the level of an immunity and should
thus be deemed within the application of Cohen." The court of
appeals, after initially finding jurisdiction, reversed itself and determined that the Act instead functioned as a statute of state law
preemption and was not analogous to the types of immunity granted as
qualified immunity, state-action immunity, or Eleventh Amendment5 7
immunity.58 The appeal was dismissed.5"
An interesting application of the Cohen test occurred in Devine v.
Indian River County School Board6 when the court inquired into its
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the denial of a motion of counsel to
withdraw and to allow the party to proceed pro se."' The court
concluded that it did possess jurisdiction because the order finally
determined the ability of the party to appear pro se, that representation
of plaintiff was separate from the action's merits, and that compelling
unwanted representation would offend the dignity and autonomy of
plaintiff and the right to conduct his case. 2 However, the ruling did
draw a dissent. The dissent maintained that the third prong of the
Cohen test had not been met because the denial of leave to proceed pro
the courthouse
se did not rise to the level of barring the litigant from
63
and did not immediately destroy a fmdamental right.
Cohen's third prong was found to be a barrier to appeal in Kaufman
v. Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc.," an action involving an
employment dispute. The employee sought an interlocutory appeal from
the decision of the district court not to entertain pendent state law
claims under its supplemental jurisdiction.65 The court of appeals
found that the employee failed to demonstrate that collateral estoppel
would bar the claims he sought to protect on appeal and that as a
55. Id. at 1255. The McCarran-Ferguson Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(1994).

56. 117 F.3d at 1257.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. Schrenko, 109 F.3d 680
(11th Cir. 1997).

58.
59.
60.
61.

117 F.3d at 1257.
Id. at 1258.
121 F.3d 576 (1997).
Id. at 578.

62. Id. at 579-80. The court distinguished a series of Supreme Court cases holding that
representation-related orders were not subject to immediate appeal based on the third
prong of its analysis. Id. at 581.
63. Id. at 586 (Harris, J., dissenting).
64. 122 F.3d 892 (11th Cir. 1997).
65. Id. at 893.
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consequence he was not at immediate risk of irretrievable loss."
Under that circumstance, the appeal was dismissed.67
IV. TIMELINESS OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL AND PRESENTATION OF
ARGUMENT
When a party fails to timely file a notice of appeal, an appellate court
is without jurisdiction to proceed.' Notwithstanding this general rule,
the federal rules do permit a district court to extend the time for the
filing of a notice upon a showing of excusable neglect."' In this circuit
a determination of whether excusable neglect is present takes the form
of a flexible analysis of factors such as the danger of prejudice to the
nonmovant, the length of time of the delay, the reason for the delay, and
whether the movant acted in good faith.7"
Though the court of appeals liberalized the rule concerning excusable
neglect in 1996, the sequel to that case includes some important caveats
to the more liberal rule. In Advanced Estimating System, Inc. 71 the
Court had the opportunity to re-visit the case in which it broadened
consideration of late-filed appeals. The first appeal had resulted in a
remand to the district court for a determination of whether excusable
neglect had been shown. Following the remand, the district court found
that excusable neglect existed, but the court of appeals disagreed.
According to the opinion, since the claim of excusable neglect arose out
of counsel's misunderstanding of the federal rules, excusable neglect
could not be shown as a matter of law. 72 Thus, even though this circuit
continues to recognize a more liberal standard for excusable neglect, an
attorney's misunderstanding of the plain language of a rule cannot
constitute excusable neglect such that a party is relieved of compliance
with a statutory deadline.73
In Zipperer v. School Board,74 the court of appeals determined that
the district court had properly exercised its discretion in extending the

66. Id. at 894-95.
67. Id. at 895.
68. Pinion, 928 F.2d at 1525.
69. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5).
70. Zipperer v. School Bd., 111 F.3d 847, 849 (11th Cir. 1997). This case marks an
application of the liberalization of the excusable neglect standard initiated by the Supreme
Court in PioneerInvestment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates, Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 388
(1993), and adopted by this circuit last year in Advanced EstimatingSystem, Inc. v. Riney,
77 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 1996).
71. 130 F.3d 996 (11th Cir. 1997).
72. Id. at 998.
73. Id.
74. 111 F.3d 847 (11th Cir. 1997).
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time for an appeal under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA")75 when the notice of appeal was filed one day late and had been
mailed
more than six days prior to the deadline but was delayed in the
76
mail.
Another issue that surfaced with surprising frequency during the past
year was the failure of an appellant to raise arguments or claims prior
to an appeal. The general rule is that an appellate court will not
consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal." However,
the rule is not without exception. This circuit has permitted consideration of an issue not raised until appeal when the issue involves a pure
question of law if refusal to consider it would amount to a miscarriage
of justice. 7' The reasoning behind the exception is that precluding
consideration of an issue is a rule of practice, not jurisdiction, and
therefore, an appellate court may exercise its discretion in determining
whether to reach an issue.79 In determining whether to extend
consideration to an issue not raised below, an appellate court will look
to the twin factors of avoiding prejudice to the parties and judicial
economy.8 0 The courts may also elect to reach unraised issues when
the proper resolution is beyond all doubt."1
V. DOCTRINES OF STANDING, RIPENESS, JUSTICIABILITY, AND
MOOTNESS

Standing of a party to proceed with an action is a jurisdictional
question and may be the most important of the jurisdictional doctrines.8 2 In Engineering Contractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade
County," the court discussed standing in an affirmative action context
and found standing to exist based upon certain stipulations of the
parties.8 4 In this regard, the court noted that while parties cannot
stipulate to a court's jurisdiction, they can stipulate facts that bear on

75.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1997).

76. 111 F.3d at 850.
77.

Herman v. Nationsbank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1997) (failure to raise

argument until reply brief precluded court consideration); Bok v. Mutual Assurance, Inc.,
119 F.3d 927 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting exceptions to rule exist, but finding them
inapplicable).
78. Damiano v. FDIC, 104 F.3d 328, 333 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997).
79. Ochran v. United States, 117 F.3d 495, 502 (11th Cir. 1997).
80. Id. at 503.
81. Id.
82. Engineering Contractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 903
(11th Cir. 1997).
83. 122 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 1997).
84. Id at 905-06.
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the jurisdictional inquiry 5 As it happened, these stipulations were
crucial to the, determination of standing; the court explained that
stipulations are designed to remove the burden of parties to introduce
evidence and that it would look to the stipulations as evidence that
plaintiffs were impacted by the programs under attack."
Closely related to the standing doctrine is the issue of ripeness. The
ripeness doctrine protects federal courts from engaging in speculation or
Deciding
wasting, resources on potential or abstract disputes.8 7
ripeness compels inquiry into the fitness of issues for judicial decision
and the hardship to the parties of withholding consideration.8 In
9 the court of appeals
Digital Properties, Inc. v. City of Plantation,"
affirmed the district court's dismissal of a property owner's claim for
zoning violations. 90 According to the opinion, though the injury
requirement is applied most loosely in the First Amendment9 1 context,
the case presented was not mature due to plaintiffs rush to the
and his erroneous assumptions about the accrual of a
courthouse
2
9

claim.

Whereas ripeness indicates the existence of an unmatured claim, the
opposite principle is expressed in the mootness doctrine: when rights
that have accrued nevertheless become unenforceable due to the
occurrence of subsequent events or passage of time. At least two cases
involved a determination of mootness last year.9 In one of these cases,
the court applied the mootness doctrine to specific claims, declining to
hear an injunctive relief claim but permitting a damages claim to go
forward."
A final area of federal jurisdictional scrutiny is a determination of
whether a claim is justiciable. The justiciability of a controversy is not
dependent on the existence of a federal statute but on whether judicial
resolution of a controversy is consonant with the separation of powers
principles contained in the U.S. Constitution," A fascinating case
study of this principle is found in Aktepe v. United States," in which
85. Id. at 905.
86. Id. at 905-06.
87. Digital Properties, Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 589 (l1th Cir. 1997).

88. Id.
89.

90.
91.
92.
93.
Lucero
94.
95.
96.

121 F.3d 586 (11th Cir. 1997).

Id. at 591.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
121 F.3d at 591.
Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 102 F.3d 1172 (lth Cir. 1997);
v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591 (11th Cir. 1997).
121 F.3d at 596.
Aktepe v. United States, 105 F.3d 1400 (11th Cir. 1997).
105 F.3d 1400 (11th Cir. 1997).
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the court reviewed the lower court's dismissal of an action by Turkish
sailors and their representatives who were injured when a United States
naval vessel engaged in war games erroneously fired a live missile at the
Turkish shipY The court concluded, as had the district court, that the
controversy was not justiciable because it constituted a political
question." The court found that entertaining the action would require
the judiciary to interject itself into military decisionmaking and foreign
policy, areas entrusted to correlative governmental branches." An
attempt by plaintiffs to frame the dispute as a negligence action,
routinely cognizable in the courts, was rejected because adjudicating the
negligence issue would require invasion of the military chain of
command."°
VI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A statement of the standard of review applicable to each of a party's
contentions on appeal is required in this circuit." 1 Tb assist the
practitioner in satisfying this requirement, the court has detailed the
applicable standards in the following situations: review of sanctions
applied under rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 review
of jurisdictional dismissal,"° review of a district court ruling as to
admissibility of evidence,' review of a motion for relief from judgment
under rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,0 5 review of
summary judgment,"° review of jury instructions, 0 7 review of a
motion to alter or amend judgment under rule 59 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure," review of a denial of attorney fees under Title
VII,' review of a decision under the Federal Tort Claims Act,"0
review of a motion for new trial,"' review of denial of a motion for

97. Id. at 1401.
98. Id. at 1404.
99. I&
100. Id.
101.
TH Cmr. R. 28-2(IXiii)).
102. Battles v. City of Ft. Myers, 127 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 1997).

103. Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 126 F.3d 1380 (11th Cir. 1997).
104. Heath v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 126 F.3d 1391 (11th Cir. 1997).
105. United States v. Route 1, Bryant, Ala., 126 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 1997).

106. Gay v. Gilman Paper Co., 125 F.3d 1432 (11th Cir. 1997).
107. Eskra v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 1406 (11th Cir. 1997).
108.
109.
110.
111.

Day v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 122 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 1997).
Canup v. Chipman-Union, Inc., 123 F.3d 1440 (11th Cir. 1997).
Mesa v. United States, 123 F.3d 1435 (11th Cir. 1997).
Carter v. Decisionone Corp., 122 F.3d 997 (11th Cir. 1997).
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preliminary injunction," review of an interpretation of foreign
law,11 review of factual findings by the district court,1 4 review of

forum non conveniens determination,"' review of conflict of law
determination," 6 review of attorney fees determination under 42
U.S.C. § 1988,117 review of a class certification under rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"' review of a motion under rule 56(f)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," 9 review of confimation of an
arbitration award, 120 review of a voluntary dismissal of a com22
plaint, 21 review of denial of pro hac vice admission of an attorney,123
judgment,
of
offer
an
of
review of a district court's interpretation
review of motion under rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,"2 review of a decision regarding the constitutionality of a
statute,' 5 review of a motion for joinder-intervention, 126 review of a

decision on judgment on the pleadings under rule 12(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure," 2 review of a district court's statutory
interpretation, 28 review of questions of law,"2 review of a renewed
motion for judgment on the law,"0 review of a district court's modification of a permanent injunction,'13' review of findings of fact and
conclusions of law,3 2 and review of a qualified immunity determination."

112. Kaimowitz v. Orlando, 122 F.3d 41 (opinion amended on rehearing 131 F.3d 950

(11th Cir. 1997)).
113.

United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1997).

114. General Trading, Inc. v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485 (11th Cir.
1997).

115.

Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings, 119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997).

116. Lafarge Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 118 F.3d 1511 (11th Cir. 1997).
117. Mills v. Freeman, 118 F.3d 727 (11th Cir. 1997).
118. Heaven v. Trust Co. Bank, 118 F.3d 735 (11th Cir. 1997).
119. Carmical v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 117 F.3d 490 (11th Cir. 1997).
120. Kahn v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 115 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1997).
121. Negron v. City of Miami Beach, 113 F.3d 1563 (11th Cir. 1997).
122. Schlumberger Techs., Inc. v. Wiley, 113 F.3d 1553 (11th Cir. 1997).
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